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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is about a subcontractor attempting to revive expired lien rights by tacking 
together two separate improvements-. the construction of roadways in a residential subdivision 
and the construction of cart paths on the adjoining golf course-when the first project ended 
approximately 113 days before there was an enforceable agreement regarding the second project. 
The lien claimant, Hap Taylor and Sons d/b/a Knife River ("K.t'1ife River"), had an 
outstanding balance of$166,603.50 for the work it did on the residential roadways. Between the 
time Knife River completed the roadways and the time it began working on the cart paths, the 
lender, Integrated Financial Associates, recorded its deeds of trust. Knife River's outstanding 
balance for the cart paths was $49,474.80. On October 27, 2007, 181 days after it completed 
work on the roadways and 60 days after it completed its work on the cart paths, Knife River filed 
nine separate claims of lien against different portions of the Summerwind Development, each 
claim of lien seeking to recover the total amount of $217,385.8i for its combined work on the 
two projects. 
Integrated Financial Associates and its successors in interest, Summerwind Partners, LLC 
and Idaho Golf Partners, Inc. (collectively, "IF A"), took issue with Knife River tacking these two 
projects together and challenged the validity and priority of Knife River's claims of lien. 
Alternatively, IF A sought to subordinate Knife River's claims of lien on the grounds that Knife 
River did not designate on its claims of lien the amounts due on the two separate projects, as 
required by Idaho law. The district court fOll..T1d IFA's arguments, evidence and authority 
unpersuasive and granted summary judgment declaring Knife River's claims of lien valid and 
1 This amount includes a $1,307.52 charge for a repair job on the roadways. 
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superior in priority to IF A's deeds of trust. Over IF A's continuing objections, the district court 
entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure allowing Knife River to recover the entire amount 
due for both the roadways and the cart paths from the golf course lots and to the exclusion of the 
residential lots. And, even though Knife River did not work at all on the back nine-holes of the 
golf course, the entire golf course was included in the decree of foreclosure. 
By this appeal, IF A respectfully request that this Court reverse the district court's 
decision on either or both of two independent legal matters: (i) that Knife River improperly 
tacked together the roadway work and the cart path work, or (ii) that Knife River was required to 
designate on its claims of lien the specific amounts due for work on the two different projects. 
Alternatively, IF A requests that this Court remand the matter to the district court with 
instructions requiring it to take evidence regarding the amount of land subject to Knife River's 
claim oflien so that the decree of foreclosure complies with Idaho Code § 45-505. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
This appeal is taken upon the district court's entry of a final judgment and decree of 
foreclosure following its grant of Knife River's successive motions for summary judgment and 
denial of IFA's motions for summary judgment and successive motions for reconsideration. 
Because the district court disposed of all matters on summary judgment, no trial was held. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
1. General Overview. 
This case involves the infrastructure development of a residential subdivision and golf 
course located near Greenleaf, Idaho. The name of the project was "Summerwind at Orchard 
Hills," and the owner was Union Land. Extreme Line Logistics, Inc. ("ELL") contracted with 
Union Land for the work relating to the residential roadways; ELL then subcontracted with 
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cross-respondent, Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., d/b/a Knife River and fonnerly known as Masco, to 
do the asphalt paving. Approximately four months after the roadways were completed, ELL 
contracted with Union Land to construct the golf course cart paths and ELL subsequently 
subcontracted with Knife River to do some of that work. Knife River constructed cart paths on 
what would become the front nine holes of the golf course. 
2. Creation and Performance of the Agreement for the Residential Roadways. 
Sometime in June or July of 2006, Casey Daniels, president of ELL, was approached by 
Jim Conger to work on the Summerwind development. R. Vol. 6, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo. 22:20-
23:12). Among other things, ELL's initial scope of work on the Summerwind Project included 
cutting and paving the roads for a residential subdivision. R. Vol. 6, p. 1012 (Daniels Depo. 
24:3-21). While some work involving the golf courses was contemplated at the time ELL 
entered into its original contract with the developer, there was no certainty regarding the scope of 
the asphalt work required for the golf courses so the golf course cart paths were not included as 
part of ELL's original contract with Union Land. R. VoL 6, pp. 10 17 -18 (Daniels Depo. 44 :9-
45:12). 
ELL did not place and compact asphalt so it was necessary for ELL to subcontract with 
an asphalt company do that work. R. VoL 6, p. 1013 (Daniels Depo. 25:9-20). Typically, 
Daniels, on behalf of ELL, would use the developer's plans to estimate the amount of asphalt 
necessary to fulfill ELL's contract and then solicit bids from companies to supply, place, and 
compact the asphalt. R. Vol. 6, p. 1015 (Daniels Depo. 35:25-37:14). At the time ELL solicited 
bids for the residential roadways, the only asphalt work specified on the plans was work for the 
residential roadways. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1017 (Daniels Depo. 44:13-15,44:23-25) and 1018 (Daniels 
Depo. 45:8-12); R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 62:9-13). The plans did not reflect asphalt 
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work for the cart paths because, at that time, the scope of work required for the cart paths was 
unknown. R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 62:14-18). ELL estimated that it would take 
approximately 6,020 tons of asphalt to complete the residential roadways and requested 
proposals from local asphalt companies based on that estimate. R. Vol. 6, p. 1021 (Daniels 
Depo. 60:3-23). 
Knife River (then known as Masco) submitted the winning proposal. The "Masco 
Proposal" dated June 26, 2006, stated a unit price of $64.50/ton for placing fu"1d compacting 
approximately 6,020 tons of asphalt (R. Vol. 6, p. 1042)--the exact amount ELL estimated to be 
necessary to complete the residential roadways. 
ELL and Knife River worked together building the residential roadways. ELL prepared 
the roadways and Knife River completed construction by placing and compacting the asphalt. R. 
Vol. 6, p. 1014 (Daniels Depo. 32:11-33:7). Knife River worked on the roadways during two 
timeframes: it paved the first half from November 11, 2006, through November 14, 2006, (R. 
Vol. 3, pp. 383-410) and paved the second half from April 20, 2007, through April 27, 2007 (R. 
Vol. 3, pp. 357-82). Knife River's employees logged all of their time for the roadways under job 
number 66062. R. Vol. 3, p. 357-410. The roadways are complete. R. Vol. 6, p. 1011 (Daniels 
Depo. 20: 15-18). The last date any Knife River employee logged time under job number 
66062-the roadway job number-was April 27, 2007. See, e.g., R. Vol. 3, p. 371. 
Knife River's May 25,2007, invoice to ELL for the roadway work shows an outstanding 
balance of $166,603.50. R. Vol. 7, p. 1153. The roadway invoice references the roadway job 
number 2566062, the last five numbers being identical to the job number used by Knife River's 
employees to track their time on the project. R. Vol. 7, p. 1153. 
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3. IFA's Deeds of Trust. 
IFA recorded its interests in the property on July 13, 2007. R. Vol. 4, p. 600, ~ 10; R. 
Vol. 4, p. 621, ~ 15. 
4. Creation and Performance of the Agreement for the Cart Paths. 
ELL and the developer had two separate contracts for the roadway work and the cart path 
work. R. Vol. 6, p. 1048; 1017 (Daniels Depo. 44:6-8). On August 15, 2007, ELL sent the 
developer a proposal for the cart path work. R. Vol. 6, p. 1044. Though Daniels had previously 
discussed the possibility of cart path work with individuals at Knife River (R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 
(Daniels Depo. 63:3-65:25)), when ELL submitted its initial cart path proposal to Union Land, 
ELL did not intend to subcontract the asphalt work for the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1027 (Daniels 
Depo. 83 :21-84: 10). Rather, ELL planned to do that work itself. R. Vol. 6, p. 1027 (Daniels 
Depo.83:21-84:10). 
On August 16, 2007, the day after ELL submitted a proposal to the developer for cart 
path work and nearly four months after Knife River had completed the residential roadways, 
ELL requested that Knife River prepare a change order estimating its cost for supplying asphalt 
for and paving the cart paths. R. Vol. 3, p. 3312; R. Vol. 7, p. 1124; see also R. Vol. 6, p. 1036 
(Daniels Depo. 118:24-119:8). Typically, when dealing with a "unit based" contract ELL would 
not solicit change orders; it would simply request additional work under the existing unit based 
contract. R. Vol. 6, p. 1016-17 (Daniels Depo. 40:24-41:6). Because the discussions regarding 
who would construct the cart paths and how the cost would be determined changed so frequently 
during that timeframe, Daniels was unable to recall with any degree of certainty how the parties 
2 The Rosin Affidavit correctly describes the small job worksheet for the cart path work, the exhibit attached to the 
affidavit was the small job work sheet for a patch/repair job on the residential roadways. The correct small job 
worksheet is found at R. Vol. 7, p. 1124. 
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finally settled upon the price for Knife River's work on the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1028 
(Daniels Depo. 85:23-87:18). 
During the course of the proceedings below, ELL and Knife River both claimed that they 
intended for the cart path work to be part of the Masco Proposal. R. Vol. 7, p. 1093 (Rosin Aff., 
,-r 14). However, both Knife River and ELL acknowledge that the cart path work was additional 
work that was not specifically contemplated by the Masco Proposal. R. Vol. 3, p. 331 (Rosin 
Aff, ~ 12); R. Vol. 6, pp. 1032-33 (Daniels Depo. 104:15-105:1). 
Knife River worked on-site constructing the cart paths from August 17, 2007, to August 
29,2007. R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-54. The first date that Knife River's employees logged any time for 
the cart path work was August 17,2007 (R. Vol. 3, p. 347), 113 days after Knife River finished 
working on the residential roadways. R. Vol. 3, p. 371. Knife River worked on only the front 
nine holes of the golf course. R. Vol. 6, p. 10 11 (Daniels Depo. 20: 19-21: 17). Knife River's 
employees logged their time for the cart path work under job number 77423 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-
54), not the 66062 job number that had been used for the roadway work (R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-410). 
The back nine holes were not paved and no prep work was done. R. Vol. 6, p. 1012 (Daniels 
Depo.21:12-17). 
The cart path invoice of $49,474.80 is dated August 29,2007, and references job number 
2577423. R. Vol. 7, p. 1155. Consistent with the pattern seen on the roadways invoice, the last 
five numbers on the cart path invoice are the same numbers that Knife River's employees used to 
log their time for work on the cart path project. Compare R. Vol. 3, p. 340-345 and R. Vol. 7, p. 
1155 (cart path employee logs and invoice) with R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-410 and R. Vol. 7, p. 1153 
(roadway employee logs and invoice). 
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5. Patch-job work. 
On July 16,2007, Knife River did a small repair job to fix a part of the asphalt that had 
been damaged by construction activities. R. Vol. 3, p. 338. Daniels has no recollection of 
authorizing this work and testified that he believed it was ordered by his foreman to cover up 
some damage to the residential roadways caused by ELL. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1030-31 (Daniels Depo. 
96:2-97:4). Daniels confirmed that the small job worksheet for the patch job did not make any 
reference to the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1030 (Daniels Depo. 97:5-9). 
Knife River employees tracked their work for the patch job with job number 77351. R. 
Vol. 3, p. 355-56. The roadway patch job invoice for $1,307.52 is dated July 16, 2007, and 
references job number 2577351. R. Vol. 7, p. 1154. Consistent with the pattern seen on the 
roadways and the cart paths, this reference matches the number that Knife River employees used 
to track their time for that job. R. Vol. 3, pp. 355-56. 
6. Knife River's claims of lien. 
At the time it filed its claims of lien, Knife River had three unpaid invoices totaling 
$217,385.82: $166,603.50 for the roadways, $49,474.80 for the cart paths, and $1,307.52 for the 
patch job. R. Vol. 7, pp. 1153-55. On October 25, 2007, Knife River filed nine separate liens 
for its work; each lien claimed the full amount due on the combined projects-$217,385.82: 
1. Phase I: Lots 1 and 9, Block 2 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 497-99) ("Laidlaw Lien") 
2. Phase II: Lot 48, Block 1 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 512-14) ("Aebischer Lien") 
3. Phase II: Lot 52, Block 1 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 526-28) ("Youngblood Lien") 
4. Phase II: Lot 8, Block 4 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 541-43) (,'Scott Lien") 
5. Phase II: Lot 17, Block 4 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 556-69) ("Benson Lien") 
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6. Phase II: Lot 62, Block 1 and Lot 10, Block 4 (R. Vol. 4, pp. 573-75) ("Status Homes 
Lien") 
7. Lien on remainder of Phase II (R. Vol. 4, pp. 591-93) ("Phase II Lien") 
8. Lien on remainder of Phase I (R. Vol. 4, pp. 611-13) ("Phase I Lien") 
9. Lien on Lot 20, Block 43 ("Zameke Lien"). 
Knife River settled with the Aebishers, Bensons, Laidlaws, Scotts, Y oungbloods, and Zamekes 
based on apportioned amounts that Knife River set forth in its foreclosure complaints. R. Vol. 6, 
p. 864 (Krueck Aff., ~~ 10 & 11). Liens numbered 7 and 8 above are the liens at issue in this 
lawsuit. 
Approximately six months into the foreclosure action, for the stated purpose of 
"providing constructive notice of the amounts the plaintiffs sought in its foreclosure actions" 
counsel for Knife River prepared partial lien releases (R. Vol. 6, p. 864 (Krueck Aff., ~ 9)), 
reducing the amount claimed on the Phase I Lien from $217,385.82 to $114,845.32 (R. Vol. 6, 
pp. 869-71) and reducing the amount claimed on the Phase II Lien from $217,385.82 to 
$84,083.21 (R. Vol. 6, pp. 872-74). 
7. Current Ownership of the Properties. 
While this action was pending, IF A foreclosed on its deeds of trust. The following 
Trustee's Deeds were recorded, each naming the grantee as Summerwind Partners, LLC, a 
special purpose entity comprised of the investors in the IF A loan: 4 
1. Phase II: Lot 18, Block 4, recorded on March 17,2009 (R. Vol. 7, pp. 1 77-78); 
2. Phase II: Lots 49-51,53-61,63-65,67-68, Block 1, recorded on Jan 29,2009 (R. Vol. 
7, pp. 1179-80); 
3 The Zarneke Lien does not appear in the record. 
4 IFA is a member ofSummerwind Partners, LLC. R. Vol. 9, p. 1470. 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8 
3. Phase I: Lots 1, 2-14, 16 and 18, Block 1, recorded on January 29, 2009 (R. Vol. 7, 
pp. 1181-82); 
4. Phase I: Lots 15 & 17, Block 1, recorded on January 29,2009 (R. Vol. 7, pp. 1183-
84). 
5. Phase I: Lots 19-38,39, & 40, Block 1, recorded on January 29,2009 (R. Vol. 7, pp. 
1185-86). 
6. Phase I: Lots 2-8, 10-14, Block 2; Lot 15 Block 2; Lot 1, Block 3, and 
Phase II Lots 2-7, 9, 11-16, and 19, Block 4 recorded on January 29,2009 (R. Vol. 7, 
pp. 1187-88); 
On February 15, 2011, Summerwind Partners, LLC recorded a special warranty deed that 
conveyed the golf course lots to Idaho Golf Partners, LLC (R. Vol. 9, pp. 1458-64): 
• Phase I: Lots 1, 16, 17, 18,39, and 40, Block 1; 
• Phase I: Lot 15, Block 2; 
• Phase II: Lots 41 and 66, Block 1; 
• Phase II: Lot 1, Block 4. 
The front nine holes of the golf course are located on Phase I. R. Vol. 8, p. 1270. The back 
nine-holes of the golf course are located on Phase II. R. Vol. 8, p. 1271. 
8. Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
IFA filed for bankruptcy protection on March 14, 2011. R. Vol. 9, p. 1470. After 
receiving notice of IF A's filing, Knife River moved for entry of judgment against only the golf 
course lots on the grounds that neither IF A nor Surnrnerwind Partners, LLC held any ownership 
interest in the golf course lots. R. Vol. 9, p. 1470. Knife River reasoned that it could attempt to 
collect as much as possible from the golf course lots and, if that sale was insufficient to satisfy its 
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lien, it would then seek relief from the automatic stay and seek a judgment against the remaining 
subdivision lots. R. Vol. 9, p. 1472. IFA opposed the motion. R. Vol. 9, pp. 1476-82. 
Before the district court ruled on Knife River's motion, Summerwind Partners, LLC tIled 
for bankruptcy protection. R. Vol. 9, p. 1495. Knife River moved for entry of judgment a 
second time. R. Vol. 9, p. 1490. At oral argument, counsel for IF A and Summerwind Partners, 
LLC, renewed the objection to the form of judgment and relief requested. R. VoL 9, p. 1534. 
The district court granted Knife River's motion and entered ajudgment and decree of foreclosure 
allowing Knife River to recover for its claims oflien on the golf course lots only. R. Vol. 9, pp. 
1534 & 1543-51. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether a lien claimant may tack together work on two projects when 113 days elapse 
between completion of the first project and reaching an enforceable agreement regarding 
the scope of work on the second project. 
2. Whether the construction of residential roadways and golf course cart paths constitute the 
types of improvements to which Idaho Code Section 45-508 applies. 
3. Alternatively, whether the district court erred in refusing to apply Idaho Code Section 
45-505 to claims of liens arising from construction of improvements to the land. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by this appeal involve statutory interpretation and whether the 
district court properly applied the facts to the law when granting Knife River's motions for 
summary judgment. This court reviews an appeal from an order granting summary judgment on 
the same grounds as the district court when deciding a motion for summary judgment. A & J 
Canst. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). Review of the district 
court's interpretation of a statute is an issue of law, over which this Court exercises free review. 
Parkwest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013). This Court also exercises free 
review of the application of undisputed facts found to the law. Union Pac. Corp. v. Idaho State 
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Tax Comm'n, 139 Idaho 573, 575, 83 P.3d 116, 118 (2004). Accordingly, this Court exercises 
free review over all matters subject to this appeal. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the decision and order of the district court granting K..llife 
River's motion for summary judgment regarding the validity and priority of its mechanic's lien 
over IF A's deeds of trust because such decision was based on Knife River improperly tacking 
together work done pursuant to two separate contracts or agreements in order to revive expired 
lien rights. As an additional or alternate basis, this Court should order that Knife River's claims 
of lien are subordinate to IF A's interest in the property because Idaho Code § 45-508 required 
Knife River to apportion on its claims of lien the amounts due for roadway work from the 
amounts due for cart path work. Finally, if this Court rejects both prior arguments, this Court 
should hold that the district court committed reversible error by entering a judgment and decree 
of foreclosure without first taking evidence, as required by Idaho Code § 45-505, regarding the 
amount ofland necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the land subject to the lien. 
A. The district court erred by allowing Knife River to tack two separate projects 
together to revive an expired lien. 
The district court should have found that Knife River's lien claims for the roadway work 
were untimely and that Knife River's lien claims for the cart path work were subordinate to 
IF A's deeds of trust. 
A lien claimant is required to file its claim of lien within 90 days after the completion of 
the labor or services giving rise to the claim of lien. IDAHO CODE § 45-507. Knife River 
completed its work on the roadways on April 27, 2007. R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-82. Knife River did 
not file its claims oflien until October 25,2007, 181 days after it completed the roadways. See, 
e.g., R. Vol. 4, pp. 591-93 and 611-13. Because Knife River's claims of lien were not filed 
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within 90 days of completion of the roadways, the liens-insofar as they encompass roadway 
work-are untimely. 
Mechanic's liens obtain their priority date from the date the lien claimant commenced 
working on the project. IDAHO CODE § 45-506. Knife River did not enter into an enforceable 
agreement to work on the cart paths until August 16, 2007 (R. Vol. 3, p. 331 and R. Vol. 7, p. 
1124) and did not start cart path work until August 17,2007 (R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-54). IFA 
recorded its deeds of trust on July 13,2007, more than a month prior. R. VoL 4, p. 600, ,10; R. 
Vol. 4, p. 621, ~ 15. Because Knife River commenced work on the cart paths after IFA recorded 
its deeds of trust, the liens-insofar as they encompass cart path work-are junior to IF A's deeds 
of trust. 
The district court improperly allowed Knife River to tack its work on these two projects 
together, thereby allowing Knife River to revive expired lien rights for its work on the roadway 
and giving priority to Knife River for its work on the cart paths. Because Knife River should not 
have been allowed to tack these two projects together, the district court's decision regarding 
validity and priority should be reversed. 
1. Knife River had two separate contracts with ELL regarding the residential 
roadways and the golf course cart paths. 
The undisputed facts of this case establish that the roadways and the cart paths were not 
constructed pursuant to a single contract. In order for a contract to come into being, it must be 
sufficiently certain and definite to identify what acts are expected and when performance is 
completed. Dales'Service Co. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d 1102, 1104 (1975). If 
material terms are left open for negotiation, then no contract comes into being. Spokane 
Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 621, 226 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2010) 
(quoting Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974, 984 (2005) 
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(quoting from 17A Am. Jr. 2d Contracts s. 181 (2004))). Lien claimants are not permitted to 
tack two contracts together in order to extend the time for filing their lien. Valley Lumber v. 
Driessei, 13 Idaho 662, 669, 93 P. 765, 767 (1907). 
When Knife River and ELL entered into the Masco Proposal, the scope of work required 
for the roadways was the only scope of work sufficiently certain and definite to give rise to an 
enforceable contract. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1017 (Daniels Depo. 44:13-15, 44:23-25) and 1018 (Daniels 
Depo. 45:8-12); R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels Depo. 62:9-13). This is because, at the time of the 
Masco Proposal, ELL did not have a contract for the cart paths. R. Vol. 6, p. 1022 (Daniels 
Depo. 62: 14-18). The reason ELL did not have a contract for the cart paths was that no one 
knew when the cart paths would be constructed, how they would be constructed, who would 
construct them, where they would be located, or what they would cost. R. Vol. 6, pp. 1017-1018 
(Daniels Depo. 44:9-45:12). Given that ELL did not have a contract for the cart paths, and that 
none of the material terms regarding the cart paths were known, it is not possible that the Maseo 
Proposal was "sufficiently certain and definite" to give rise to an enforceable contract regarding 
the cart paths. The district court erred in concluding that the Masco Proposal governed both 
projects. 
2. Lien claimants should not be permitted to revive expired lien rights by 
adding an additional scope of work to a completed contract. 
As a result of concluding that the roadways and cart paths were both done pursuant to the 
Maseo Proposal, the district court impermissibly allowed Knife River to revive its expired lien 
rights by virtue of an alleged "change order" to a completed contract. 5 Under Idaho law, a lien 
5 The district court found that because of the lack of specificity in the Masco Proposal and, because language in the 
Masco Proposal allowed for overages and price increases for the roadway asphalt, that the subsequent addition of 
asphalt to complete the cart path project was consistent with the original Masco Proposal. IFA's December 10, 
2013, Motion to Augment the Record to include Order on Defendant IFA's Motion for Reconsideration dated 
October 26,2010 ("October 26,2010 Order") at 19. 
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claimant cannot extend the time for filing its claim of lien by engaging in trivial work. Mitchell 
v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 231,506 P.2d 455,458 (1972). A lien claimant also cannot extend the 
time for filing by tacking two separate contracts together. Valley Lumber & Manufacturing, Co. 
v. Driessel, 13 Idaho 662, 669, 93 P. 756, 767 (1907) (citing Central Loan & Trust Co. v. 
O'Sullivan, 44 Neb. 834,63 N.W. 5 (1895)). Along these same lines: 
Where all the items of an account except the last few were supplied 
under one contract and that contract was executed and the 
transaction closed, held, that the time for filing a lien could not be 
extended by furnishing on a new request additional articles and 
adding them to the completed account. 
Id. (quoting Schulenburg v. Vrooman, 7 Mo. App. 133 (1879)). 
Knife River completed the roadways on April 27, 2007. R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-382. ELL did 
not enter into a contract for the cart path work until August 15, 2007, (R. Vol. 6, pp. 1044) 
approximately 112 days after Knife River completed the roadways and approximately 22 days 
after Knife River's lien rights for the roadways expired. Until that time, the material terms 
required to give rise to a contractual obligation for the cart path were still not in place. Indeed, it 
was not until August 15, 2007-when Union Land and ELL contracted for the cart path work-
that ELL even had authority to subcontract the cart path work out to Knife River. And, it was 
not until August 16,2007, that ELL decided it would actually subcontract the cart path work to 
Knife River, rather than do the work itself. Significantly, if ELL had decided to not use Knife 
River for the cart path work, Knife River would not have been afforded the opportunity to tack 
the two projects together. 
The district court found that the small job worksheet was properly characterized as a 
"change order" that served only to modify the existing Masco Proposal by requesting more of the 
same types of materials and services. Oct 27, 2010 Order at 17-24. However, even if this Court 
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finds that the golf course was an amendment to the existing contract, because the material terms 
related to the cart paths were not sufficiently definite and certain to give rise to an enforceable 
agreement between ELL and Knife River until August 16, 2007, 113 days after Knife River 
completed the roadways, Knife River should not be allowed to use this alleged amendment to a 
completed contract to revive its expired lien rights. 
3. A 113-day lapse oftime between two projects should, as a matter oflaw, have 
put Knife River on notice of two contracts between ELL and Union Land. 
Though it is undisputed that ELL and Union Land had two separate contracts relating to 
the cart path work, the district court erroneously found that there was no evidence that Knife 
River had knowledge of facts sufficient to put it on notice of the separate contracts. Standing 
alone, the fact of a 113-day time lapse between Knife River completing the roadways and 
reaching an agreement regarding the cart path should be sufficient as a matter of law to have put 
Knife River on notice that ELL might have had two separate contracts with Union Land. 
Current case law requires that lien claimants exercise some degree of diligence in 
protecting their lien rights. If a lien claimant has knowledge of facts indicating that two separate 
contracts exist between a contractor and an owner, the subcontractor may be charged with 
knowledge of those separate contracts. Gem State Lumber Co. v. School District No.8, 44 Idaho 
359, 363, 256 P. 949, 950 (1927). "Lapse of time" and "cessation of work" are two types of 
facts that put a lien claimant on notice that there might be two contracts between the contractor 
and owner. Valley Lumber v. Driessel, 13 Idaho 662, 681, 93 P. 765, 772 (1908); see also Gem 
State Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No.8, 44 Idaho 359, 362, 256 P. 949 (1927) (indicating that at 
some point a lapse of time becomes unreasonable). Unlike a strict materialman who delivers 
materials to a job site and then leaves, when a subcontractor is on the job site to complete a 
specific portion of a project, it is axiomatic that the subcontractor has actual knowledge of the 
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status and the project. Franklin Building Supply v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 851, 87 P.3d 955, 
960 (2004). 
There can be no justifiable basis for a subcontractor who is working on-site a.l1d who has 
completed the portion of work required by its existing contract to wait 113 days-a time frame 
beyond which his lien rights would otherwise expire-for the possibility of future work on a 
related project. If the future work does not materialize, the subcontractor will have lost its lien 
rights. At a minimum, a subcontractor expecting that more work might be forthcoming-but not 
having a contract sufficiently certain and definite to guarantee that future work-should be 
expected to inquire as to when and pursuant to what authority additional work might be 
authorized. A subcontractor should not be allowed to sit idly by while its lien rights expire in the 
hope of obtaining future work that it can then tack onto the previously completed contract for 
purposes of reviving expired lien rights. 
The undisputed evidence in this case shows that Knife River completed the roadway 
work on April 27, 2007, but did not reach an agreement regarding the cart path work until 
August 16,2007, 113 days later. At a minimum, Knife River should have been asking questions 
of ELL regarding whether the cart path work the parties had previously considered would 
actually materialize. In those inquiries, Knife River could have and should have iearned that 
ELL did not yet have a contract for the cart path work. Because the lapse of time between 
completing one project and being assigned the next project was enough that Knife River's lien 
rights for the roadways would have otherwise expired, this 113-day lapse of time should be 
sufficient, as a matter of law, to have put Knife River on notice that there were two contracts 
between ELL and Union Land. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's order 
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insofar as it concluded that Knife River had no reason to know of the existence of two contracts 
between ELL and Union Land. 
B. The district court erred in concluding that Idaho Code § 45-508 did not require 
Knife River to apportion on its claim of lien the amounts due for the roadway 
project and the cart path project. 
Even if this Court finds that only one contract governed both the roadway project and the 
cart path project, it should still overrule the district court's decision that Knife River's claims of 
lien are superior to IF A's deeds of trust because Knife River did not designate on its claims of 
lien the amounts due for the roadway work and the amounts due for the cart path work. IDAHO 
CODE § 45-508 provides that when 
... one (1) claim is filed against two (2) or more buildings, mines, 
mining claims, or other improvements owned by the same person, 
the person filing such claim must, at the same time, designate the 
amount due him on each of said buildings, mines, mining claims, 
or other improvement; otherwise, the lien of such claim is 
postponed to other liens. 
The district court held that section 45-508 did not apply to Knife River's claims of lien because 
the roadways and cart paths constituted a single improvement, constmcted under a single 
contract (Order Granting Motion to Augment the Clerk's Record dated November 19, 2013, 
enclosing Order on Defendant IF A's Second Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff s Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated December 23,2011 ("Dec. 23, 2011 Order") at 11-13) and, 
further, that the roadways and cart paths were not the types of improvements subject to 45-508 
(ld. at 7-10). 
This Court should overrule the district court's holding on these points for two reasons: 
First, the undisputed evidence shows that Knife River apportioned the work at every phase of the 
two projects; second, the language of Idaho Code § 45-501, the legislative history of Idaho's 
Mechanic's lien statutes, and the language of Idaho's Contractor's Registration Act all point to 
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the conclusion that roadways and cart paths are properly classified as "structures" and the district 
court's classification was incorrect. 
1. The residential roadways and golf course cart paths are two separate 
improvements, readily capable of apportionment. 
As a threshold issue, this Court must decide if roadways and cart paths are a single, 
indivisible improvement, or two separate and distinct improvements. If there is nothing to be 
apportioned, section 45-508 simply does not apply. 
The rule to be derived from the principals of Hopkins Northwest Fund, LLC v. 
Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, which relied heavily on the California case of Warren v. Hopkins, is 
that the mandate of section 45-508 requires a lien claimant to designate or apportion amounts 
due and owing on separate projects where it is feasible to do so; however, the statute does not 
require apportionment when it would create an artificial or arbitrary designation of amounts due. 
151 Idaho 740, 746,264 P.3d 379,384 (2011) (discussing Warren v. Hopkins, 110 Cal. 506,42 
P. 986 (Cal. 1895». 
Unlike the present case, both Warren and Hopkins Northwest involved situations where 
apportionment was neither practical nor feasible. In Warren the work at issue involved leveling 
two adjacent lots, owned by the same person, by taking dirt from one and filling in the other. 
Warren, 110 Cal. at 511, 42 P. at 987-88. The price for the work was fixed at "ten cents per 
cubic yard for filling." Id The Warren Court found that it was not possible to designate the 
separate amounts chargeable to the two blocks and concluded that statutory apportionment was 
not required. Id 
While the improvements at issue in Hopkins Northwest were of a more complex nature, 
the analysis remained the same. In Hopkins Northwest, the lien claimant was obligated by a 
single contract to construct a golf course, with all its component parts: driving range, tee boxes, 
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fairways, greens, and other components. 151 Idaho at 747, 264 P. 3d at 386. The golf course 
was constructed as a single project, not its separate component parts. Id. And, perhaps most 
significantly, "'nothing in the record indicates that either [the lien claimant's] work or the 
compensation it was to receive for the work was divided up based upon geography." Id. Based 
on these factors, the Hopkins Northwest Court found that, under the facts presented in that case, 
the golf course construction was not readily capable of apportionment. 
The work performed by Knife River is different from Warren and Hopkins Northwest in 
every material respect. Knife River performed the roadway work and the cart path work 
pursuant to two separate agreements, with more than a full year separating the dates when the 
relevant parties reached agreements regarding the scope of work defining the respective projects. 
R. Vol. 6, p. 1042 and R. Vol. 3, p. 331; see also R. Vol. 6, p. 1036 (Daniel's Depo. 
118:24-119:8). Knife River's employees tracked their work on the two projects under two 
different job numbers. Compare R. Vol. 3, pp. 357-410 with R. Vol. 3, pp. 340-345. Knife 
River invoiced the work for the project using two different invoice nu.mbers, both of which 
corresponded with the job numbers used by their employees for the respective projects. R. Vol. 
7, p. 1153 and R. Vol. 7, p. 1155. Knife River completed work on the roadways 113 days before 
it reached an agreement defming the scope of work for the cart paths. R. Vol. 3, p. 357-382 and 
R. Vol. 6, p. 1044. 
The district court concluded that Knife River was not required to apportion its work on 
the two projects because both projects were done pursuant to a single contract-the Masco 
Proposal. Dec. 23, 2011 Order at 11-13. While the lien claimants in both Hopkins Northwest 
and Warren did performed their work under a single contract, the nature of their contracts were 
so materially different from the two separate agreements at issue in this case, that particular 
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factor adds very little to the analysis. Even if this Court finds that Knife River's two separate 
agreements do constitute a single contract, it does not change the other factors deemed material 
by the Hopkins Northwest and Warren Courts: namely that the two projects were (i) agreed to at 
separate times, (ii) performed at separate times, (iii) tracked under separate job numbers, (iv) 
invoiced under separate job numbers, and (v) constructed on different physical locations.6 
Unlike the lien claimants in Hopkins NOrlhwest and Warren, not only was Knife River's work 
readily capable of apportionment, Knife River actually apportioned it at every stage of the 
respective projects. 
Because Knife River's work on the roadways and the cart paths was actually apportioned 
by K..'1ife River, it satisfies the two or more improvements requirement of section 45-508 and this 
Court must next consider whether section 45-508 applies to the type of improvements K..l1ife 
River constructed. 
2. The district court improperly classified the residential roadways and golf 
course cart paths as the type of improvements that are exempt from Idaho 
Code § 45-508. 
As an additional basis for refusing to apply Idaho Code § 45-508, the district court 
incorrectly classified the roadways and cart paths as "improvements to the land" rather than 
"structures." December 23, 2011 Order at 7-10. Based on Hopkins Northwest's holding that 
section 45-508 does not apply to "improvements to the land" the district court refused to apply it 
to Knife River's claims oflien. December 23, 2011 Order at 10. 
Under ordinary principals of statutory construction, the roadways and the cart paths are 
properly characterized as "structures" rather than "improvements to the land." The interpretation 
6 Knife River's position that the residential subdivision and the adjacent golf course constitute a single, indivisible 
development is belied by the fact that the judgment and decree of foreclosure entered in this case-which allows the 
golf course to be sold separate and apart from the residential lots-demonstrates that the two improvements are, 
indeed, separate. 
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of a statute, and its application to the facts, are questions of law for the COlLrt. Callies v. 0 'Neal, 
147 Idaho 841, 847, 216 P.3d 130, 136 (2009). When interpreting a statue that contains both 
specific and general terms, the doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that "where specific words 
of description are followed by general terms, the latter will be regarded as referring to persons or 
things of a like class of those particularly described." Washington Water Power Co. v. Kootenai 
Environmental Alliance, 99 Idaho 875, 881, 591 P.2d 122, 128 (1979). Idaho Code § 45-501 
identifies "railroad" and "wagon road" in the list of specific things that is followed by the general 
description "or any other structures." This somewhat archaic reference, which is the function of 
the statute as originally enacted, is consistent with the type of listed in as structures in more 
recent legislation. Specifically, Idaho's Contractor's Registration Ace (the "ICRA") defines 
construction activities as those involving a "building, highway, road, bridge, or other 
structure .... " IDAHO CODE § 54-5203(3). Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, roadways and 
cart paths are sufficiently similar to a "railroad," a "wagon road," a "highway," and a "road," that 
they are properly classified as "structures." 
Moreover, the classification of roadways and cart paths as structures is consistent with 
the history of Title 45, Chapter 5. As originally enacted, section 45-501 provided lien rights for 
structures only. Hopkins Northwest, 151 Idaho at 745, 264 P.3d at 385. Given that the statute, as 
originally enacted, listed wagon roads and railroads in the category of Lhings that would have 
been subject to a lien, there can be no doubt that without the 1951 amendments Knife River 
would have been able to successfully claim that the roadways and cartpaths were "structures" 
and, therefore, would have been entitled to liens upon the same for its work. While the 1951 
amendments sought to make it clear that a person was entitled to a lien for "improvements to the 
7 Compliance with the ICRA is required to have a valid mechanic's lien. IDAHO CODE § 54-5208. Statutes in the 
same chapter or act relating to the same subject matter should be construed in para materia. Killeen v. Vernon, 121 
Idaho 94, 97, 822 P.2d 991, 994 (1991). 
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land, itself, regardless of whether it was locating within the limits of an incorporated city or 
town" (Id.), there is no suggestion that the legislature intended for the 1951 amendments to 
reclassify the types of liens previously available. This Court should reject the district court's 
classification of the roadways and cart paths as "improvements to the land" and hold, instead, 
that roadways and cart paths are properly classified as structures. 
The roadways and cart paths are (i) readily capable of apportionment and (ii) the type of 
improvements contemplated by Idaho Code § 45-508. Accordingly, this Court should hold that 
because Knife River did not designate on its claims of lien the amounts due on the two different 
improvements, its liens are subordinate to all other liens on the property, including IFA's deeds 
of trust. 
C. The district court erred by entering a judgment and decree of foreclosure without 
first taking evidence regarding the amount of land necessary for the convenient use 
and occupation of the liened res. 
Even if this Court disagrees with IF A's position on the two dispositive points discussed 
above, the matter should still be remanded to the district court with instructions to take evidence 
regarding the amount of land subject to Knife River's claims of lien. In this matter, and over 
IF A's objections, the district court entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure allowing Knife 
River to foreclose on less than all of the land where it performed work and on land where it did 
no work at all. Moreover, the district court entered this decree of foreclosure without first taking 
evidence of the amount of land necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the liened res, 
in contravention ofIdaho Code § 45-505. It is the district court's statutory duty to take evidence 
regarding the amount of land subject to the lien and the failure to do so mfuidates reversal. Idaho 
Lumber & Hardware Co. v. DiGiacomo, 61 Idaho 383, 102 P.2d 637,639 (1940). 
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The only authority within Idaho's mechanic's lien statute pursuant to which a court may 
enter a decree of foreclosure on land beyond the contours of that improved by the lien claimant's 
efforts is found in Idaho Code § 45-505. Chief Industries, Inc. v. Schwendiman, 99 Idaho 682, 
686-87,587 P.2d 823, 827-28 (1978). The district court refused to apply section 45-505 because 
it had previously classified Knife River's liens as liens for improvements to the land and, 
building error upon that misclassification, the district court held that section 45-505 does not 
apply to that type of lien. December 23, 2011 Order at 14. However, there is nothing within 
Idaho Code § 45-505 that supports that conclusion. Indeed, the plain language of section 45-505 
requires that it be applied to any and all types of lien created under section 45-501 including 
improvements to the land: 
The land upon which or in connection with which any 
professional services are performed or any building, improvement 
or structure is constructed, together with a convenient space about 
the same, or so much as may be required for the convenient use 
and occupation thereof. ... 
(emphasis added). Because it applies to "the land upon which any improvement is 
constructed, together with a convenient space about the same" section 45-505, by its plain terms, 
does authorize an incidental lien upon all improvements--even improvements to the land itself. 
Any argument that section 45-505 should not apply because section 45-505 applies only 
to improvements that have been "constructed" and improvements to the land are not fairly 
characterized as "construction" can and should be rejected. Idaho's Contractor's Registration 
Act makes it clear that any type of improvement contemplated by Idaho's lien law is properly 
considered "construction," including improvements to the land. Notably, the legislatUre defined 
"construction" as "the performance of building, altering, repairing, adding to, subtracting 
from, improving, reconstructing, moving, excavating, wrecking or demolishing any building, 
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highway, road, bridge, or other structure, project development or improvement to real property 
.... " IDAHO CODE § 54-5203(3) (emphasis added). This language necessary includes activities 
that give rise to improvements to the land, as contemplated by the second part of 45-501. 
Accordingly, even though improvements to the land do not necessarily result in a structure, they 
are still properly referred to as construction, and section 45-505 should apply. 
The district court refused to apply section 45-505 on the grounds that it had previously 
concluded that Knife River's claims of lien were of the second type created by section 45-501. 
While Idaho Code § 45-501 does grant a lien upon the land for improvements to the land, section 
45-501 does not indicate how much land is subject to such lien and does not contain any 
authority allowing the district court to enter a judgment and decree of foreclosure that encompass 
land where the lien claimant did no work. Schwendiman, 99 Idaho at 686-87, 587 P.2d at 
827-28. Similarly, section 45-501 does not allow a court to enter a decree of foreclosure on less 
than all of the land subject to the lien. Accord A. A. Baxter Corp. v. Home Owners & Lenders, 7 
Cal. App. 3d 725, 858-59 (1970) (criticizing decree of foreclosure related to a lien for grading 
and leveling on the grounds that it allowed lien claimant to recover the entire amount from a 
subsection of the tract graded, thereby subjecting the foreclosed property to a disproportionate 
share of the amount due); CS& W Contractors, Inc. v. Southwest Savings & Loan Assoc., 883 
P.2d 404 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that the decree of foreclosure must equitably apportion the liens 
as per the different lots subject to the lien so as to not place an undue burden on a subset of the 
land where the work was performed). 8 
There is no authority within section 45-501 for the district court to have entered a 
judgment and decree of foreclosure that excludes land where Knife River did the majority of the 
8 Consistent with this authority, Knife River did equitably apportion the amounts due and owing from the individual 
lots that were subject to the Laidlaw, Aebischer, Youngblood, Scot, Benson, Status Homes, and Zameke liens. R. 
Vol. 6, p. 864 (Krueck Aff., ~~ 10 & 11). 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 24 
work and which includes land where Knife River did no work. Because the clear, unambiguous 
language of section 45-505 applies to all types of liens created by section 45-501-including the 
construction of improvements to the land-the district court erred by refusing to take evidence 
regarding the amount of incidental land necessary for the convenient use and occupation of the 
res subject to Knife River's claim of lien. Accordingly, this matter should be remanded with 
instructions to take such evidence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, IF A requests that this Court reverse the decision of the district 
court and hold, instead, that IFA's interest in the subject property are superior to Knife River's 
claims of lien. Alternatively, IFA requests that this Court reverse the district court's decision 
and remand with instructions to take evidence regarding the amount of land necessary for the 
convenient use and occupation of the land subject to the lien. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2013. 
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